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Optimal Unemployment Insurance

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This RePEc Biblio topic is edited by Christian Zimmermann (pzi1). It was first published on 2012-12-21 06:37:33 and last updated on 2012-12-21 12:37:33.

Most relevant JEL codes

• J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics -- Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics -- Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers --- Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

Most relevant NEP reports

NEP reports are email or RSS notifications about new research in selected fields. Subscriptions are free.

• NEP-LTV Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty

Most relevant research

1. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979, "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 87, issue 6, pages 1347-1362, December, DOI: 10.1086/260839.
   • Steven Shavell & Laurence Weiss, 1978, "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 503.
2. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978, "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 10, issue 3, pages 379-402, December.
3. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997, "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 105, issue 2, pages 412-438, April, DOI: 10.1086/262078.
   • Hopenhayn, H. & Nicolini, P.J., 1996, "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 421.
   • Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas Sargent, 1999, "Matlab code for Hopenhayn-Nicolini's optimal unemployment insurance model," QM&RBC Codes, Quantitative Macroeconomics & Real Business Cycles, number 18, revised .
4. Wright, Randall, 1986, "The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 377-399, December.
5. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992, "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 100, issue 1, pages 118-142, February, DOI: 10.1086/261809.
   • Gary D. Hansen & Ayse Imrohoroglu, 1990, "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 583, Jan.
   • Hansen, G.D. & Imrohoroglu, A., 1990, "The Role Of Unemployment Insurance In An Economy With Liquidity Constraints And Moral Hazard," Papers, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics, number 21.
6. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996, "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 1, pages 1-41, June.
   • Wang, C. & Williamson, S., 1995, "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1995-13.
   • Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Steve, 1996, "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 5088, Jan.
   • Williamson, S. & Wang, C., 1995, "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 95-09.
   • Stephen Williamson & Cheng Wang, 1995, "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy," Macroeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9506002, Jun.
7. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999, "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 107, issue 5, pages 893-928, October, DOI: 10.1086/250084.
   • Acemoglu, D. & Shimer, R., 1997, "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 97-9.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998, "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6686, Aug.
8. Pallage, Stephane & Zimmermann, Christian, 2001, "Voting on Unemployment Insurance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 42, issue 4, pages 903-923, November.
9. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002, "Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 49, issue 7, pages 1337-1371, October.
   • Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002, "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 10133, Jan.
   • Williamson, Stephen D. & Wang, Cheng, 1999, "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 99-03, Jan.
10. Gruber, Jonathan, 1997, "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 87, issue 1, pages 192-205, March.
11. Pavoni, Nicola, 2007, "On optimal unemployment compensation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 54, issue 6, pages 1612-1630, September.
12. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Burhanettin Kuruscu & Aysegul Sahin, 2002, "Unemployment Insurance and the Role of Self-Insurance," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 5, issue 3, pages 681-703, July, DOI: 10.1006/redy.2002.0159.
13. Raj Chetty, 2008, "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 116, issue 2, pages 173-234, April, DOI: 10.1086/588585.
    • Raj Chetty, 2008, "Erratum: Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 116, issue 6, pages 1197-1197, December, DOI: 10.1086/597025.
    • Chetty, Raj, 2008, "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics, number 9751256.
14. Andersen, Torben M. & Svarer, Michael, 2010, "Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 5196, Sep.
    • Torben M. Andersen & Michael Svarer, 2010, "Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2010-16, Sep.
    • Andersen, Torben M & Svarer, Michael, 2009, "Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 7334, Jun.
    • Andersen, Torben M. & Svarer, Michael, 2009, "Business cycle dependent unemployment insurance," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 1498.

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