IDEAS Papers Articles All topics Start of topic tree

Your path in the tree: Start > Environmental and Natural Resource Economics > Climate economics > International agreements

International agreements

Narrower topics in the RePEc Biblio tree

• Experimental evidence

---

This RePEc Biblio topic is edited by Richard S.J. Tol. It was first published on 2012-12-07 12:33:57 and last updated on 2017-08-10 02:42:17.

Introduction by the editor

Greenhouse gas emission reduction is a global public good.

Most relevant JEL codes

• Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
• C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

Most relevant NEP reports

NEP reports are email or RSS notifications about new research in selected fields. Subscriptions are free.

NEP-GTH (Game Theory)
• NEP-ENV (Environmental Economics)

Most relevant research

1. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
   • Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscaico, Domenico, 1994. "Environmental policy reconsidered: The role of technological innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 545-554, April.
3. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-765, September.
4. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
   • CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   • Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., "undated". "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
5. Germain, Marc & Toint, Philippe & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 79-99, October.
6. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
   • EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers 1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
7. Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
8. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
9. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
10. Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-186, July.
11. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.
12. Michael Hoel, 1993. "Harmonization of carbon taxes in international climate agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(3), pages 221-231, June.
13. de Zeeuw, Aart, 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 163-174, March.
    • Aart de Zeeuw, 2005. "Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2005.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
14. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    • van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1990. "International aspects of pollution control," Discussion Paper 1990-65, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Van Der Ploeg, F. & De Zeeuw, A.J., 1990. "International Aspects Of Pollution Control," Papers 9065, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
15. Bohm Peter, 1993. "Incomplete International Cooperation to Reduce CO2 Emissions: Alternative Policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 258-271, May.
16. Alistair Ulph & David Maddison, 1997. "Uncertainty, learning and international environmental policy coordination," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(4), pages 451-466, June.
    • Ulph, A. & Maddison, D., 1995. "Uncertainty, learning and international environmental policy co-ordination," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9507, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
17. Escapa, Marta & Gutierrez, Maria Jose, 1997. "Distribution of Potential Gains from International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Greenhouse Effect," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-16, May.
18. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
19. Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2016. "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 160-204.
    • Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2012. "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," NBER Working Papers 18585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
20. Bård Harstad, 2016. "The Dynamics Of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 719-752, 06.
    • Bard Harstad, 2009. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," Discussion Papers 1474, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Bård Harstad, 2010. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," CESifo Working Paper Series 2962, CESifo Group Munich.

Privacy Legal